Representative Reform—The Cnmulative Vote. 


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SPEECH 


OF 




CHARLES R. BlICKALEW, 

OF PENNSYLVANIA, 


AT THE 


ASSEAIBLY BUILDINGS, PHILADELPHIA, 

TUESDAY EVENING, NOVEMBER 19, 1867; 

(WITH AN APPENDIX.) 


Fellow-Citizens of the City of Philadelphia: 

You have had stated to you the circum¬ 
stances under which I appear in your presence 
to speak upon the subject of representative 
reform. Without any introductory remarks, 
without pausing over preliminary topics, I 
shall proceed to the subject-matter of my dis¬ 
course. y 

Ours is said to bq a Government of the peo¬ 
ple, meaning by that term the whole electoral 
body with whom the right of suffrage is lodged 
by our constitutions. The people, considered 
in this sense, are said to rule themselves, and 
our system is therefore described as one of 
self-government. Those who are bound liy 
the laws are to enact them. Power is in the 
first instance exerted by them and olvedience 
yielded afterward. All rests upon their volun¬ 
tary assent and upon their free action. But, 
as it is impossible that the whole mass of the 
political community should assemble together 
.. for the purpose of enacting or agreeing upon 
those rules of conduct which are to bind the 
citizens, and as it would be impossible for 
such an enormous body, even if it were con¬ 
vened, to act with convenience or to act at all, 
we, like the people of other countries in former 
times, have resorted to what is known as the 
representative system. 

From the impossibility of convening our¬ 
selves together to determine those great ques¬ 
tions which pertain to the political and social 
bodies, and about which government is em¬ 
ployed, we have determined to select from 
among ourselves a certain number of persons 
with whom shall be lodged all our powers con¬ 
nected with legislation and with government, 
and whatsoever they shall determine shall be 
to us and to all men within our borders the 
law of individual conduct. 

Well, now, gentlemen, in carrying on this sys¬ 
tem of representEttive government the manner 
in which the agents of the people shall be 


selected becomes in the highest degree import¬ 
ant. ■ Although by our theory, although by 
our fundamental principle of self-government' 
by the people, all the people are to be repre¬ 
sented in the making of laws and in the ad¬ 
ministration of government, in point of fact 
we have not attained to this result. We have 
fallen short of it in our arrangements, and 
hence it is that men of intelligence and of 
sagacity, driven to their conclusions by thor¬ 
ough examination and by full inquiry, have 
been compelled to declare that our system is 
imperfect, and imperfect to such an extent 
that the, quality of our government is affected, 
and many pernicious things have place in its 
administration. 

Instead of there being under the represent¬ 
ative system, as it is known among us, a rep¬ 
resentation of the entire electoral body, of all 
the individuals who compose it, there is in 
fact a representation of only a part. In other 
words, representation instead of being com¬ 
plete and coextensive with all those who are 
to be represented and who are to be bound by 
the action of government, is partial and re¬ 
stricted to a part only of the political body. ' 

Well, gentlemen, in the infancy or in the 
early stages of a Government an imperfection 
of this kind may be permitted or overlooked. 
The afiPairs of society when they are not com¬ 
plicated, before the conimunity has become 
rich, before its affairs, social and political, 
become involved and intricate, may admit of 
very rude and imperfect arrangements, and yet 
the people may be well governed, the laws may 
be just and wholesome and administered in the 
proper spirit and witli complete success. But, 
as wealth accumulates, as population becomes 
dense and great cities grow up, as vices are 
spread through the social body, and as widely 
extended *ud complicated political action be¬ 
comes r Missary, those earlier and simpler 
arrange’ »3—imperfect always—become pos- ^ 





















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itivel}^ pernicious and hurtful; and the neces¬ 
sity arises for their 'correction, and that the 
system of government shall be purified and 
invigorated by amendment. 

In your popular elections which are held or 
taken under the majority or rather under the 
plurality rule, (which ordinarily amounts to the 
same thing,) at your popular elections the 
smaller number of voices which are spoken 
in the election of representatives who are to 
enact your laws are stricken from the count. 
When the officers charged with the duty of 
collecting the voices of the people come to • 
make up the count and declare the result, they 
strike from the poll or the return all those who 
when numbered are the smaller quantity or the 
smaller political force. Then after your repre¬ 
sentatives selected in this manner by a majority 
merely, by a part of the community, are con¬ 
vened together, when they come to act in the 
business of government, to enact laws, they 
again act by a similar rule. The majority in 
the representative body pronounce the opin¬ 
ion and decree of that body, and what they pro¬ 
nounce becomes law, binding upon all the 
people. Now, what is observable in this state¬ 
ment of facts? Why, that in the fireplace, 
in selecting representatives you strike on a* part 
of the political body ; then, again, in represent¬ 
ative action you strike off the minority of the 
representative body, who represent another 
portion or mass of the popular electors. The 
result is that your laws may be made by men 
wdio represent a minority of the people who 
are to be bound by the laws so made. A rep¬ 
resentative majority may not be, in point of 
fact—and often is not— a representative of the 
majority of the people. 

AV^heu we come to consider in addition to this 
that the representative majority, whether in a 
State Legislature or in Congress, in modern 
times or comparatively corrupt times, when 
pernicious and selfish interests invade the halls 
of legislation, ordinarily acts under what is 
known as the caucus system; you perceive how 
far we have departed from those popular prin¬ 
ciples upon which we professed to found our 
system originally, and which we supposed would 
give vitality and energy to its action. A cau¬ 
cus, a private consultation of majority mem¬ 
bers, rules the action of the representative 
majority. That majority rules the entire rep¬ 
resentative .body, and that representative body 
is composed of representatives of only a part 
of the political community. Is it not then 
established by this inquiry that instead of our 
representative system being what we originally 
intended it to be, and what we had supposed it 
would be, it is in its practical action character¬ 
ized by imperfections Avhich must arrest uni¬ 
versal attention when the facts are examined 
and provoke a cryjfor some measure of amend¬ 
ment and reform? And if a project of reform 
and amendment can be brought forward which 
is practicable, reasonable and wise, it will be 
our business to embrace it with ‘yromptness 
and with gladness of heart. 7 

Now, what do we desire? We moj esire that 
the whole people, instead of a p if them. 


shall be represented in the Government, and 
that is precisely what I propose. In accom¬ 
plishing this object, differences of opinion, as 
in all cases of new investigations, may be ex¬ 
pected. One may have one project and another 
another. In a time of inquiry, of movement in 
the public mind, it is not well and it is not to 
be expected that all minds should run in the 
same channel; and that out of the inquiries 
which individuals enter upon the same ultimate 
proposition should be evolved by each. How 
will we then obtain representation in govern¬ 
ment of the entire mass of the people? Let us 
come to that question, and in coming to it 
inquire into the several plans or projects which 
have been suggested to secure this object. They 
may be classed under three heads/ In the first 
place, it has been proposed in various forms 
that by law there should be a restricted or 
limited mode of voting. Again, it has been 
proposed that the elector in all elections of 
representatives and of other officers where more 
than one are to be chosen, may bestow his votes 
upon a smaller number than the whole; in 
other words, may exercise what is known aS' 
the cumulative vote. Again, there has been 
proposed in Great Britain and elaborately 
defended in that country what is called the 
system of personal representation, by which an 
elector shall be emancipated from the ordinary 
bonds and trammels of party organization, and 
shall be as an individual and not as a member 
of a party represented in Parliament or other 
body of a similar constitution. 

Now, as to the first of these, that is, the limited 
or restricted vote—I use these words because I 
have none more expressive or convenient at 
hand—as to this limited vote : When you pass 
to your places of election and proceed to choose 
for yourselves the election officers who shall 
hold elections during the year in your several 
election districts, what do you do? 

Each elector votes for one inspector, aJhdyet 
two are chosen. Here is a limitation upon the 
voter. Instead of voting for both, the law says 
that he shall vote for but one. What is the 
practical result throughout the State under this 
law? Why, that one inspector belongs to the 
majority party in each election district, and the 
other belongs to an opposing one. In other 
words, both the parties into which our political 
society is ordinarily divided are represented in 
the election boards. Thus you secure repre¬ 
sentation of the entire mass of the electors, and 
yet you secure it by a limitation upon the votes 
of individual electors. 

What has been the practical result of this 
arrangement which is found in your State elec¬ 
tion law of 1839? Has the result been good 
or bad? Why, there is not a man who hears 
me, or an intelligent, honorable citizen in this 
Commonwealth, who would not cry “ shame” 
if that law were repealed. It is a law by which 
elections are kept comparatively pure, by 
which fraud is prevented and fairness is se¬ 
cured to the citizen in polling his vote. 

I believe iti this city, when you come to 
choose assessors in your several wards, those 
interesting persons who have control over your 








3 


pockets, [laughter,] who take valuations of 
your property, whose action as public officeer 
is most interesting to you, each elector votss 
for one, and yet two are selected. In this case 
you are secured, I presume, against partiality 
and injustice in the administration of the tax" 
laAvs by dividing these otficers between polit¬ 
ical parties. 

I am told, also, that in selecting your school 
directors each school division or ward has 
twelve directors who lia-ve charge of your 
school system—one third, that is four, elected 
in each year. In voting, each elector votes 
for but three, so that it ordinarily happens that 
the fourth man chosen each year will be of a 
different opinion politically from the majority 
of his fellow-directors; Avill represent in the 
government of the school district one kind of 
opinion, while the greater number of his col¬ 
leagues will represent another. 

At the last session of your State Legislatui’e 
a law was passed which took from the commis¬ 
sioners of counties and sheriffs the selection 
of jurors for the several courts throughout the 
Commonwealth. Great complaints were made 
in this matter, especially in the interior of the 
State. *¥011 had a particular arrangement in 
the city which has not been disturbed, to wit: 
the selection of jurors by the judges of the 
several courts, in order to insure impartiality 
and fairness and prevent the intrusion of polit¬ 
ical interests or passions in the selection of 
your jurors. But in the interior the duty of 
selecting jurors, which was formerly charged 
upon the commissioners and the sheriffs of the 
several counties, was taken away at the last 
session of the Legislature and confided to two 
officers in each county, who are to be called 
jury commissioners. The president judge in 
each county has some function or duty in connec¬ 
tion with these officers—it is someAvhat doubtful 
Avhat it is ; the law was badly drawn—but sub¬ 
stantially the power of selection heretofore 
•exercised by the ordinary officers of counties 
to whom I have referred is now to be confided 
to these jury commissioners. , 

How are they to be chosen? As in the case 
of insjDectors^of election, where one candidate 
alone is voted for but two are to be chosen. 
By this means it is to be supposed that there 
will be fairness in the selection of jurors 
throughout the State, and the abuse Avhich has 
heretofore prevailed will be removed from our 
system—the abuse that in Republican counties 
Democratic citizens were excluded to an un¬ 
reasonable extent from the jury-box, and that 
on the other hand in Democratic counties Re- 

S ublican jurymen were unreasonably excluded. 

[ere again is a limitation upon the elector. 
He shall vote for but one of these officers, 
who are to select the men who may sit upon 
questions which relate to his life, to his prop¬ 
erty, or to his reputation, and yet by this limit¬ 
ation fuller representation of the people and 
fairness in trials are secured. I think that a 
much wiser arrangement might have been made 
than that. If 1 had possessed power to mold 
the law upon this subject I would have simply 
changed the mode in which county commis¬ 


sioners are chosen. I would have had them 
selected upon the plan of the cumulative vote 
(Avhich I will presently explain) or upon the 
plan of the limited vote. We would have 
obtained substantially in that way the same 
result without two additional officers and Avith- 
out certain inconveniences which attend upon 
the existing law. But the object Avas laudable 
and the effect Avhich Avill be produced by that 
law Avill be salutary. Public opinion will take 
hold of it and uphold it hereaiter as a just and 
wiser arrangement compared Avith the one it 
superseded. 

Let me illustrate this idea of limited voting 
which has obtained in our State by a case taken 
from the State of Noav York. Under the con¬ 
stitution of that State every twenty years the 
question of reforming the State constitution is 
to be submitted to a vote of the people, and in 
case they vote in favor of a convention to 
amend the constitution one is to be called. 
It happened last year that a convention was to 
be called, and Governor Fenton proposed to 
the Legislature that in addition to the selection 
of delegates from the representative districts 
of the State (one from each) there should be 
thirty-two delegates selected at large, in select¬ 
ing these thirty-two delegates each elector in 
the State to vote for but sixteen. His recom¬ 
mendation Avas adopted by the Legislature, so 
that the existing constitutional convention of 
New York (it has not concluded the perform¬ 
ance of its duties) is constituted of representa¬ 
tives elected from the representative districts, 
andyof tliirty-tv/o delegates from the State at 
large. Of the latter, sixteen belong to each 
political party, for such Avas the inevitable effect 
of the plan adopted. Many men Avent into the 
convention and are now sitting in it Avho 
could not have been elected in their several 
local districts, because the party Avith which they 
Avere associated Avas in the minority therein. 
In selecting delegates from the State at large 
this was possible, and able men were selected 
on both sides—men of great Aveight and great 
wisdom. These cases of limited voting in our 
OAvn State Avhich I have mentioned and this 
case in New York will suffice so far as our 
own country is concerned. 

Noav, let me carry you to England for a 
short time to see what has been done there in 
this same direction. In 1854, under the ad¬ 
ministration of Lord Aberdeen, Lord John 
Russell introduced a reform bill which under¬ 
went protracted discussion in the House of 
Commons. One feature of that bill was that 
in all constituencies selecting three members 
of Parliament no elector should vote for more 
than two, the result of which would have been 
to give to the minority class of electors ordi¬ 
narily the third member. That bill, hoAvever, 
did not become alaAV ; it fell, and other reform 
bills introduced since into Parliament have 
failed. But during the.present year a bill Avas 
passed through Parliament to amend and 
reform the representation of the people of Eng¬ 
land in the House of Commons. That bill 
having passed the House of Commons and 
being under consideration in the House of 












4 


Lords on the 30th of July last, Lord Cairnes 
moved to amend clause 8 of the bill by add¬ 
ing, “at a contested election for any county 
or borough represented by three members, no 
person shall vote for more than two candi¬ 
dates.” This was substantially, if not in exact 
terms, the same as the clause in the Russell 
reform bill of 1854. After undergoing debate 
this amendment was adopted in the House of 
Lords by the following vote: contents, 142; 
non-contents, 51, or by the large majority of 
91 in its favor. The bill being returned with 
this and other amendments to the House of 
Commons was again considered in that House. 
Finally, upon the 8th of August, after pro¬ 
longed and exhaustive debate, in which men 
whose names are known throughout the earth 
participated, upon motion to strike out this 
amendment made by the House of Lords the 
vote stood—ayes 204, noes 253, being a major¬ 
ity of 49 in favor of retaining the provision, 
and it was retained by that vote ; and the bill 
subsequently passing and receiving the ap¬ 
proval of the Crown it became and is now the 
law of Great Britain, (from which country we 
derive our political descent and many of our 
principles of free government, including that 
of representation.) Henceforth, in the elec¬ 
tion of members of the popular house of Par¬ 
liament, where a constituency select three 
members, two shall be given to the majority 
and one to the minority of the electors, assum¬ 
ing that the latter constitute so large a mass as 
one third of the whole number. This is the 
most notable instance of the application of the 
limited vote to secure the representation of the 
whole political mass of the community or of 
a particular constituency charged with the duty 
and power of selecting representatives for the 
enactment of laws. 

By these instances, selected in our own coun¬ 
try and abroad, it is manifest that attention has 
been largely drawn to this question of amend¬ 
ment in representation—of mitigating the evils 
and inconveniences which must always arise 
under an unchecked, unmitigated, unamended 
majority rule. 

But, gentlemen, I pass from the considera¬ 
tion of this mode of amending representation 
to the second form which propositions for that 
purpose have assumed ; in other words, I pass 
to the discussion of the topic which is most 
interesting at this time for our consideration. 
I mean the plan of cumulative voting^ as it 
has been nanjied. This was in the first instance 
proposed, exjjlained, and advocated by James 
Garth Marshall, a subject of the Crown of 
Great Britain ; and, by his proposition and 
his advocacy of it, he has given his name to 
the political history of his country and to the 
political history of representative institutions 
everywhere in future times: for no one pre¬ 
viously had mastered this subject with such 
grasp; no one had looked into it with such 
intuitive perception of all its characteristics 
and was able to strike precisely the point 
where reform could be most safely and effect¬ 
ually introduced. It is preferable, infinitely 
preferable, to all propositions for securing the 


representation of all interests in society by 
any limitation upon the elector’s vote in the 
manner of the various propositions which I 
have already described. 

This system or plan of cumulative voting 
has been indorsed by John Stuart MilUn his 
work on Parliamentary Reform and in his 
work on Representative Government, and 
since supported by him ably in the House of 
Commons. It has been recommended, also, 
by Earl Grey in his work on Parliamentary 
Reform, edition of 1864. It was proposed 
during the consideration of the recent Reform 
bill in the House of Commons by Mr. Lowe, 
on the 5th of July last, and after debate received 
the very respectable support of 173 votes. It 
is beginning to attract in this _ country that 
degree of attention which it merits, and which 
is naturally provoked by the inquiry which has 
taken place abroad. I shall describe it in a 
moment. For the present I will simply say 
that the third proposition of reform, known 
as personal representation, which looks to 
other objects and to other consequences, I shall 
not attempt to discuss to-night. It invites us 
over too wide a field of investigation for the 
time at our disposal; and I may add that it 
involves so many considerations and so much 
of prolonged debate that, within the ordinary 
duration of a meeting, it would be impossible 
to exhaust the subject or to come to any intel¬ 
ligent conclusion upon it. I presume, also, 
speaking generally concerning it, that it will 
be a considerable time before we shall be in 
possession of that amount of experience and 
of discussion which are requisite to its adop¬ 
tion in this country. 

Now, what is cumulative voting ? I propose 
that what is known by this term shall be applied 
to the election of representatives in Congress 
and to the choice of electors of President and 
Vice President of the United States. It admits, 
also, of application to the selection of senators 
and representatives in the several State Legis-- 
latures, and to the selection of county com¬ 
missioners, and possibly other officers. In 
what I shall say at this time, however, I shall 
confine myself, in the discussion of this plan, 
mainly to the election of Representatives in 
Congress. This reform can be introduced by 
act of Congress without any constitutional 
change; and the plan can be applied to the 
election of presidential electors by the Legis¬ 
latures of the several States, who, under the 
Constitution, have committed to them the 
power of providing the manner in which those 
electors shall be chosen. What, then, is cumu¬ 
lative voting? It is that where more than 
one officer is to be chosen the elector in the 
first place shall possess as many votes as there 
are persons to be chosen, and next, he may 
bestow those votes at his discretion upon the 
whole number of persons to be chosen, giving 
one vote to each, or upon any less number, 
cumulating his votes upon one, two, three, or 
any other number less than the whole. That 
is simple in its statement, although its effect, 
the practical character of the proposition, re¬ 
quires some reflection and prolonged experi- 










5 


ence to its entire comprehension. What is its 
efiPect? It is that any political interest in a 
coramuiiity, whether in a State or in a division 
of a State, if it can ascertain about the relative 
proportion which its strength bears to the 
whole mass of the vote, or to the vote of an 
0 },Iposing interest, may cast the sutfrages of its [ 
members in such manner that tliey will tell 
upon the result; and it will happen that every 
man, or about every man who votes, will vote 
for a candidate who will be chosen, and there 
will be no such thing as unrepresented minor¬ 
ities left. They will bo wiped out of the sys¬ 
tem 5 they will no longer exist. To speak of 
this as a plan for the representation of minor¬ 
ities is an abuse of terms, because it conveys 
no idea which attaches to the plan. Far be it 
from us to arm a minority vuth power which 
we Icnow even majorities abuse ! The prop¬ 
osition now submitted to us is not that there 
shall be majorities and minorities known in 
election returps, but that the men who vote 
shall vote for those who will be chosen, and 
who will in point of fact represent them. 

I cannot better illustrate the scheme than by 
the case of Vermont, which I have used on 
another occasion. There are 60,000 voters in 
Vermont, of whom 40,000 are members of the 
Republican i^arty and 20,000 of the Demo¬ 
cratic party. 1 speak in round numbers. By 
law that State is entitled to three Representa¬ 
tives in Congress, because her population, 
under the- Constitution of the United States, 
authorizes the allotment of that number to her. 
Now, what ought to take place there? The 
majority should elect two Representatives, hav¬ 
ing 40,000 votes, and the minority should elect 
one, having 20,000 votes; but can that be so 
in point of fact at present? If the electors of 
that State vote for three Representatives by 
general ticket^he majority would elect the 
whole three, u the State be divided up into 
single districts, it is a matter of chance how the 
result will be, whether all three districts will 
have majorities of the same political com¬ 
plexion or not. I say it is a matter of chance; 
nay, more than that, it is a matter of honesty 
in the Legislature of the State, and any polit¬ 
ical majority that has control of the Legislature 
will very likely form the districts to suit its own 
interests. We know that these things occur 
everywhere. By cumulative voting, by author¬ 
izing the 20,000 minority electors of that State 
to give each three votes to one candidate, that 
candidate would receive 60,000 votes, and the 
majority cannot defeat him. The majority 
voting for two Representatives can elect them, 
but they cannot elect the third. Suppose they 
attempt to vote for three candidates, they can 
only give each of them 40,000 votes, and the 
minority candidate has 60,000. If they attempt 
to vote for two, as they ought to do, that being 
the number they are entitled to, they can give 
them 60,000 votes each, the same number that 
the minority candidate has. If they attempted 
to vote for one they would give that one candi¬ 
date 120,000; but of course they would not 
throw away their votes in that foolish manner. 
The practical result would be that the 40,000 


majority electors in that State would vote for 
two candidates and elect them, and the 20,000 
minority electors would vote for one and elect 
him, and results analogous to this would occur 
all over the United States if this system were 
applied.. In every State the freemen, each pos¬ 
sessing an equal right with his neighbor, would 
each vote for a Representative or Representa¬ 
tives in Congress who wmuld speak his voice 
and obey his will, and thus you would obtain 
throughout the country, in each State, an 
actual representation of the whole mass of 
people on both sides; honest repfesentation 
instead of a sham ; a government by the major¬ 
ity in point of fact in Congress instead of an 
accidental result, which may be one way or 
the other, and is just as likely to be minority 
rule as anything else, and always and under 
all circumstances unjust rule.* 

Gill gentlemen, what w'ould happen then? 
Some little men in the vState Legislatures, 
destitute of honor but greedy of gain and of 
personal objects, would no longer gerryman¬ 
der your States, [applause,] would no longer 
sit in quiet chambers concocting injustice by 
law, studying how they can prevent their 
neighbors from being represented in the gov¬ 
ernment and get an undue share of public 
power for themselves and for their friends. 
That iniquity would be ended, and would be 
no more heard of among us. Why, gentle¬ 
men, at this moment, from the British posses¬ 
sions upon the northeast to the Golden Gate 
of the Pacific, there is probably not one honest 
apportionment law for members of Congress, 
and you will scarcely ever have one, unless in 
an exceptional case where one political inter¬ 
est shall have control of the upper branch of a 
Legislature and another of the lower, holding 
each other in check, and compelling some 
degree of fairness in the formation of the lav/. 

I do not desire to speak on any topic which 
may bear a partisan conqi^exion. I am almost 
afraid to cite cases lest I shall be thought to 
have an object or purpose not openly avowed. 
Let me tell you the difficulty in this case is in 
human nature, and you must frame your sys¬ 
tem so that mischief will not result. “It is 
necessary,” said a great and wise man, “that 
by the very constitution of things power should 
be a check to power.” What said Dr. Priestly? 
“There is no earthly power that has not grown 
exorbitant when it has met with no control.” 
Take these words of men who thought wisely ^ 
and profoundly, and then look at your exist¬ 
ing political action and see whether it is not a 
struggle for power instead of a struggle for 
justice;. whether it is not a struggle by each 
interest to obtain all it can and to retain all it 
can, and to keep away from an opposing inter¬ 
est anything like a fair distribution of power 
or fair treatment. 

It is necessary, then, gentlemen, that by your 
fixed arrangements in your constitutions and 
laws you shall curb the injustice of human 
nature; that you shall so arrange your system 
that evil and selfish men cannot pervert it to 
their own purposes and to the injury of others. 

A system of cumulative voting secures the gov* 























6 


'eminent of tbe real majority of the people. 
Instead of striking off a part of them in the 
popular elections they are all represented in 
the representative body, whether Congress or 
the State Legislature, and there by a single 
operation the vote is taken, the majority pro¬ 
nounced, and a proposed law is enacted or 
defeated. Instead of unjust representation 
and an eventual decision by a representative 
majority moved and governed by a caucus, 
you will have fair, equal, extended, complete 
representation of the whole mass of the peo¬ 
ple and the proper voice of the majority pro¬ 
nounced in the representative body. 

I repeat, this is no plan for minority repre¬ 
sentation-merely; it is a plan for the repre¬ 
sentation of the whole people, a device by 
which the majority shall rule and shall pro¬ 
nounce its voice in a fair and honest manner. 
Again, a system of cumulative voting would 
secure to you in your legislative bodies men of 
high ability, and secure them for long periods 
of time, because elections would not be sub¬ 
ject to the uncertainties which attend ordinary 
elections under the majority rule. A political 
party in Pennsylvania, constituting about or 
near one half its electors, assuming that the 
State would be permanently entitled say to 
twenty-four members, (the present number,) 
can keep about a dozen men continuously in 
Congress for a long period of time. Just as 
long as they retain the confidence of their con¬ 
stituents they will be elected, because the merit 
of this i^lan is that one part of the community 
cannot vote down another. Each will get its 
due share of Representatives, and can keep it 
always simply by giving votes only to the num¬ 
ber which they are entitled to have and which 
they can elect. This system would secure con¬ 
tentment to men constituting minorities, as 
they are now known, because such minorities 
would be abolished at popular elections, and, 
although their representatives should be voted 
down in representative bodies, they would be 
heard there, and it is a great satisfaction for a 
man to be heard even when judgment is pro¬ 
nounced against him. That is what we sup¬ 
pose to be one great advantage of courts of 
justice; a man has his day in court and he is 
heard; judgment is not pronounced in his ab- • 
sence or without a hearing. Just so minori¬ 
ties in our country, as they are now constituted, 
are dissatisfied and they always will be dissat¬ 
isfied under the present system. Let them be 
heard, and if the decision is against them in 
the legislative body they will acquiesce, be¬ 
cause they have had fair treatment. This is 
human nature. Every one can see that that 
vyould be so. Would we not, therefore, be less 
liable to revolt, to convulsion, to war? Con¬ 
tent your people, improve your S 3 '-stem so that 
it will work happily and properly, and you 
crush out the seeds of political convulsion. 
[Applause.] 

1 shall not go over the other heads of the 
argument at length, because time will not per¬ 
mit me. I insist as a principal argument, how¬ 
ever, for this mode of taking the sense of the 
electoral body, that it would be a great check 


upon corruption. Now, what causes corruption 
at our elections ? What brings it into being ? 
I submit that question to you, gentlemen, as 
men of ordinary experience. What is it? One 
candidate wants to get a majority over another 
candidate. The district may be close, or at 
least each side may have hoj^es of carrying it; 
passion is aroused; to use a common expjression 
the blood is up ; ambition calls, private interest 
prompts. Here and there we know, for so the 
fact stands revealed to us, a candidate, or the 
friends of a candidate, will resort to corrupt 
means. For what purpose? To get the balance 
of power, to turn the scale ; not to corrupt the 
great body of the electors, but to gain the tenth, 
the twentieth, or the fiftieth man who holds in 
his hands the balance of power between polit¬ 
ical interests. In this manner these contests 
for local majorities and for State majorities 
between parties call into existence all the evil 
and corrupt influences which attend our elec¬ 
tions. A man at Harrisburg or at Washington 
is expected to distribute patronage around his 
district, so that he can get votes to beat some¬ 
body else when he comes before the people 
again. A man with his pocket full of accumu- 
lated_ gain, the result of his own thrift and 
cunning or the accumulation of his ancestors, 
wants a few votes to make a majority against 
an opposing candidate, and he gives money to 
electioneering agents and does not inquire how 
it is a|)plie_d. After a while great complaints 
arc made in your community of a corrupt 
election. You hear such expressions as 
“shocking,” “horrible,” “ what is the coun¬ 
try coming to; what is the social body and 
what is the- political body coming to ?” Cor¬ 
ruption raises its head in America; it is the 
danger in our path ; it is the giant we have to 
^ear, whose blows will lay low our republican 
sj'stern if it shall ever be pri^trated. Does 
not your majority rule invite all these evil 
influences? Go out and make inquiry about 
your last congressional election in certain dis¬ 
tricts, and you will hear, “ Oh, money carried 
it; here was a boss who was bought up; he 
had control of fifty or one liundred men ;” in 
another district another had control of fifty or 
one hundred electors, and the election was 
turned. It required only a few votes to win, 
and away goes the victor to his post of duty, to 
make laws for the American people. I am not 
talking of things abroad. This cry comes to 
you in this city. Yes, corruption is increasing 
in America. And what invites it? I will 
answer in a word—it is the majority rule at 
popular elections which invites it; it is because 
you have an unjust or imperfect system by 
which nearly one half of the community have 
their voices stifled; the corrupt man buys a 
few votes, and thousands of his fellow-citizens 
have no voice in the Government; they are 
outvoted ; five votes will do it, if they create a 
majority, as well as five thousand. Adopt a plan 
by which every political party and every political 
interest, if it choose, can elect its men and can 
elect as many men as its numbers entitle it to, 
and you are done with this abuse of corrupting 
votes to turn the scale, you are done with this 











$ 


7 




purchase of majorities, you are done with this 
scandal of your system, and you have taken the 
most effectual guarantee which, with our 
present information, it is possible for us to 
secure for its integrity and its perpetuity here¬ 
after. [Great applause.] Under a system of 
Oinnulative voting, in the present Congress tlie 
delegation from this State would stand twelve 
Republicans and twelve Democrats. Why? 
Because each party has three hundred thousand 
votes in this State, and each one knowing that its 
strength was about equal to the other, would 
have cumulated its votes upon twelve men and 
elected them, and there would have been a fair 
representation of the State. Vermont would 
have had two majority and one minority mem¬ 
bers as I have shown. Kentucky, which sends 
nine Democratic members, would have sent at 
least three Republicans in her delegation, under 
a sound mode of voting; and Maryland, instead 
of one Republican member out of five, would 
have sent two ; in Connecticut, instead of three 
Democratic Representatives out of four, there 
would have been two, because the vote of the 
State was about a tie; and so throughout the 
Union. You cannot take a State and examine 
the facts relating to it in any authentic public¬ 
ation without seeing this element of injustice 
entering into your system and poisoning it at 
its very fountain. 

I need hardly say—and this is, perhaps, a 
delicate branch of my speech—that if in any 
part of this Union we are to have two classes 
of voters, distinguishable by race or color, a 
very considerable part of the mischief and 
evil which the opponents of the extension of 
suffrage apprehend, vjould be prevented or re¬ 
moved by tiie adoption of the cumulative vote. 
Instead of the cry being raised, “one race 
votes down another and has its heel upon it”— 
we have heard that all over the North, and we 
know how powerfully it has influenced the elec¬ 
tions—instead of that cry it would be announced 
that each race obtained representation in pro¬ 
portion to its numbers, without direct antagon¬ 
ism or collision. This, however, is an argu¬ 
ment for gentlemen in a different position from 
myself. As to them it ought to be decisive in 
favor of their rendering support to the plan of 
cumulative voting which I have advocated. 

Now, gentleme.n, a few words as to the appli¬ 
cation of this system to the selection of presi¬ 
dential electors. General Jackson proposed 
that the people of the United States should 
vote directly for President and Vice President, 
instead of voting for electors in their several 
States, and this proposition, at several times, 
has been brought forward in Congress. At the 
last session it was again introduced by Mr. 
Wade, now President of the Senate, and de¬ 
fended by him in an argument. • Great com¬ 
plaint is made that the people are not heard 
directly in the choice of President; that the 
electoral colleges are useless or inexpedient; 
that they should be removed from our system, 
and each voter be permitted to vote’directly 
for the President of his choice. 

Gentlemen, a system of cumulative voting 
by the citizens of Pennsylvania, which can be 


provided by an act of their Legislature as I 
understand the constitution, would secure to 
our citizens, if not the precise objects sought 
by the friends of that reform, at least greater 
advantages than it would confer. The result 
would be that each of the political interests 
existing in this State would select as many 
electors as they were entitled to by their num¬ 
bers, and each would be felt proportionably in 
the presidential election. How is it now? Do 
you not know what is coming on next year in 
our State? Six hundred thousand votes are 
to be polled for presidential electors. Each 
party has about three hundred thousand. What 
is going to take place? From Lake Erie to 
the Delaware this State is to be convulsed ; a 
thousand disagreeable circumstances arc to 
attend the election; men’s minds are to be 
taxed and worried for months; men of prop¬ 
erty are to have their attention turned to the 
security of their investments. All the unpleas¬ 
ant and illegitimate influences which attend 
elections, and to which I have referred, well be 
called into existence in that great approaching 
struggle. And why? Because whichever in¬ 
terest obtains a majority in this State, though 
it be a majority of but one vote, secures twenty- 
six electoral votes for President of the United 
States, and the struggle will be for the little 
majority which turns the scale. Now, do we 
not all see at a glance what the fact is? Each 
party is entitled to thirteen of these electors, 
or about that number, because they are com¬ 
posed of American freemen who are entitled 
to an equal voice in our common government. 
But both cannot secure electors; the whole 
twenty-six must be given to one side, and per¬ 
haps that result will determine the government 
of this country not only for four years to come 
but for four centuries. We enter upon the 
canvass as a game of chances, fearful that the 
most adroit and unscrupulous interest of the 
two in the State can command the result; 
that there will not be a fair struggle between 
the men who are honest and those who are 
not. Let us have honest voting; let each party 
have the presidential electors that its numbers 
entitle it to, and let them be felt upon the gen¬ 
eral result; let the people in each of the other 
States vote as we vote, and let the majority of 
Americans decide the contest. 

Finally, this plan of representative reform 
is convenient in a high degree; it is both 
practicable and convenient. It requires in this 
State nothing of legislation except simply to 
permit a citizen who has, say, twenty-four 
votes for members of Congress and twenty-six 
for presidential electors, to cast those votes as 
a freeman, according to his own choice and 
pleasure: let him bestow them upon any 
smaller number; for instance, giving two to 
each of twelve candidates, or four to each of 
six. Trust the people, and their common 
sense will regulate their action. You do not 
want intricate laws, constitutions tinkered, or 
a great scheme of reconstruction. [Laughter.] 
You simply want to trust the people, and per¬ 
mit them, when they possess votes, to cast 
them as they think best; as their judgment 















may be directed by views of public interest or 
^blic duty. If-we should have that system 
for electing members of Congress and presi¬ 
dential electors next fall, we can each go to 
the polls and vote for twelve Representatives in 
Congress to sit for Pennsylvania, and for thir¬ 
teen electors of President and Vice President; 
or, if any one should think that the political 
interest with which he is associated is flourish- 
ing_ and growing in strength, so that they are 
entitled to one additional member, he can vote 
for thirteen Representatives. If he should be 
mistaken in his calculation, he would fail as 
to one of his votes; numbers would be counted 
exactly, and there would be no injustice. 

Now, I must point out one additional special 
injustice of the ordinary majority rule at elec¬ 
tions, unmitigated by any such plan as that 
proposed. Observe that the party which pre¬ 
vails at the election does not merely carry the 
day, does not merely get its votes counted and 
get the result appropriate to the counting of 
them; but it gets all the power which belongs 
to the other side in addition to its own. Sup 
pose that the two parties in Pennsylvania are 
so divided that one has 300,000 votes and the 
other 301,000. In choosing electors of Presi¬ 
dent and Vice President the 301,000 who pre¬ 
vail, who have 1,000 majority, do not merely 
get their votes counted in the presidential elec¬ 
tion, do not merely influence the result in 
selecting our Chief Magistrate by their own 
votes, but they have in eflect counted into their 
vote the votes of their opponents, the other 
300,000. Your 301,000, constituting the ma¬ 
jority in the State, wield the political power of 
the whole 600,000—wield not only their own 
appropriate power but a power which does not 
belong to them but belongs to the political 
interest opposed to them. 

That is what sharpens tliis injustice of dis¬ 
franchisement, and that is the reason why, in 
legislative bodies, a little turning of the popu¬ 
lar scale gives one party or another, when in 
point of fact they are nearly equal, such a mass 
of preponderating power. 

Take the elections which occurred in 18GG 
in the States north and west, the States for¬ 
merly called the free States. In those elec¬ 
tions 2,000,000 voters (in round numbers) 
voted Republican tickets for members of Con¬ 
gress in the respective States. The other party, 
the Democracy, i^olled in those States at those 
elections a little over 1,GOO,000 votes. What 
was the result? To Congress 1,600,000 voters 
chose twenty-eight Representatives only, and 
the 2,000,000 voters one hundred and forty- 
three! The proportion between the two great 
masses of our electoral population, known by 
the respective party names, was twenty to six¬ 
teen in votes actually polled in the States to 
which I have referred. The Representatives to 
Congress selected at those elections from those 
States, instead of standing as twenty to six¬ 
teen, stood one hundred and forty-three to 
twenty-eight. And why? Because under the 
majority rule at elections in those States the 
majority not only obtained representation in 
Congress for its own votes, but obtained the 


greater part of the representation that belonged 
to the other side. Under a system of cumula¬ 
tive voting representation in Congress would 
have stood about in the proportion of twenty 
to sixteen, just as the actual votes ran in those 
States. Do you not see how the whole policy 
of your Government can be changed; how the 
voice of the people may be stifled; how repub¬ 
lican institutions may be made a farce and a 
sham, and that under a system which you are 
falsely told secures the rule of a majority as a 
principle that is sacred? 

Gentlemen, I have already occupied so much 
time that I must omit any detailed examination 
of the arguments against cumulative voting. 
I can notice only one or two of them briefly. 
It is said that a system of elections such as I 
have described would deprive particular local¬ 
ities of representation; that there would be a 
combination of great and powerful communi¬ 
ties within a State against some particular 
districts, and those districts which now have 
Representatives would be disfranchised. This 
argument has been made in Great Britain. It 
is likely to be repeated here, and it is perhaps 
the only one deserving any considerable atten¬ 
tion. Of course my political reading and 
political thought have been against the undue 
concentration of power at any particular point, 
whether Washington, Harrisburg, Philadel-. 
phia, or elsewhere, and I have been in favor 
of its distribution, as far as possible, into all 
the local communities into which the State or 
the country is divided. And this objection, 
from my point of view, deserves respectful 
treatment and respectful answer. I have to 
observe, then, that, in my opinion, particular 
localities within the State v/ould have a due 
voice and due influence in the selection of 
candidates; that if they were selected by a 
common body, by a State convention, any 
attempt to disfranchise any particular section 
of the State would be met by a counter combi¬ 
nation in the interest of fair play, and that the 
practical result would be that there would be 
on the whole a fair distribution of political 
power in the different parts of the State by the 
selection of candidates. If, however, any 
difficulty were apprehended on this ground, 
there might be a rule adopted by which nom¬ 
inations should be made by districts, a thing 
very often done in counties and also in States. 
It would be a rule to a party in making its selec¬ 
tions that there should be a distribution of its 
candidates according to district divisions, either 
those established for other purposes by some 
general State law or established by the par¬ 
ticular party oganization for its own purposes 
of selection or distribution. 

But the conclusive answer to the objection is 
this, that any important locality would have the 
power to defend itself against such injustice; 
and that is one of the merits of this system of 
cumulative voting. If there was an attempt to 
disfranchise the city of Philadelphia, to prevent 
her returning her four members to Congress, 
and the thing was gross and glaring, whatcould 
she do under a system of cumulative voting? 
Just combine her votCjOn her four men and 













9 


elect them in spite of all the other electors in 
the State, and thus any attempt at injustice in 
any section of the Commonwealth might he 
resented by the people aggrieved by cumulating 
their votes upon one or more local candidates 
of their own. They could defeat any such 
attempt at injustice and defend themselves 
against it, and the fact that they had such power 
of defense would always secure a just distribu¬ 
tion of nominations. 

Again, candidates being thus voted for by 
the whole State, there would be opportunities 
for making better selections than are made by 
the district system. Let me take an illustra¬ 
tion on this point. What a misfortune it would 
have been if the narrow intellectualities of our 
modern political reasoners had controlled in 
England when Edmund Burke was a candidate 
before the electors of Bristol in 1780, a distin¬ 
guished member of Parliament, whose name is 
given to the literature of the world for all 
future ages. He stood up in the British Par¬ 
liament defending the just rights of the Ameri¬ 
can colonies. Words in our behalf which yet 
echo through the world were heard with admi¬ 
ration and pride even by those opposed to him 
in the House of Commons. But they were heard 
with other feelings in Bristol, which he then 
represented in Parliament; and when he went 
down to his constituents, instead of reelecting 
they rejected him ; he was voted down. His 
own district had a local majority against him 
of men Avho hated America, who were with the 
king in the war he waged against our fathers. 
Their passions and prejudices were aroused 
against their eloquent representative who had 
defended America in the Parliament of the 
empire. He was defeated under the majority 
rule and a single district system. Fortunately, 
he was returned to Parliament by another con¬ 
stituency, who thought it an honor to be repre¬ 
sented by him, and he continued in the House 
of Commons as long as he lived, adorning it 
by his eloquence and his genius, and giving his 
name to his country and to the world as a cher¬ 
ished recollection for all time. In our country, 
under similar circumstances, such a man would 
remain out of Congress or out of other legisla¬ 
tive body upon a defeat in his district. He 
would be ostracized from the councils of his 
country, his voice silenced, his career v/ould 
be closed. What does cumulative voting do ? 
It enables the freemen of a State to select their 
Burkes and their Websters, their Clays and 
Calhouns, wherever they may be in a State, 
and to use their abilities so long as they please 
in shaping the legislation and administration 
of the government of the country. [Applause.] 
No ability, no merit, no eminence, no great¬ 
ness, could be stifled in any of our States under 
this system. The majority rule, which would 
seem to have been invented to submerge merit 
and to lift mediocrity, would no longer operate 
its course unchecked in American politics; the 
freemen of our country would have a breadth 
of choice which they would exercise, I doubt 
not wisely, to the advantage of themselves and 
of future generations. 

Our experience in this State and in other 


States is not in favor of carrying the idea of 
single districts very far. I drew the amend¬ 
ment to the constitution of our State by which 
your city is broken into single districts. [Ap¬ 
plause.] What was the idea of that amend¬ 
ment ? It was that one political interest should 
not absorb the whole sixteen or eighteen rep¬ 
resentatives which you send to the Legislature ; 
that a little shifting majority one wa 3 ^ or the 
other should not cast that large number of votes 
on one side or the other at Harrisburg. The 
idea was to break up the political community, 
and allow the different political interests which 
compose it, by choosing in single districts, to 
be represented in the Legislature of the State. 
Unfortunately, when that arrangement was 
made for your city, {and for Pittsburg also, to 
which it will soon apply,) this just, equal, 
almost perfect system of voting, which I have 
spoken of to-night, was unknown. It had not 
then been announced abroad or considered 
here, and we did what best we could. Now, 
however, if a change were to be made, I sup¬ 
pose the same current of opinion and of senti¬ 
ment would take place in this State which has 
prevailed in New York, where the system of 
single districts throughout the State for the elec¬ 
tion of members of the Assembly or lower legis¬ 
lative branch of that State has lost credit. The 
idea is very generally abandoned by thinking 
and reflecting men in that State. It is a fail¬ 
ure ; it has not produced the results v/hich it 
was.supposed would flow from it. Cumulative 
voting, however, comes in, and it is a principle 
which is capable of extended application to 
popular elections, where more than a single 
officer is to be chosen. It can be applied to 
the election of representatives in the Legisla¬ 
ture from your city and from each of the coun¬ 
ties of the State, or any districts into which the 
State might be divided for either representa¬ 
tives or senators, and you may thus get in the 
government of your own State that fair and 
equal representation which you ought to claim 
and which is your due as citizens of a free 
State. 

After some further remarks, Mr. Buckalew 
concluded as follows: 

Gentlemen, I have said most of what I pro¬ 
posed to say this evening, so far as points of 
argument are concerned. I omit some minor 
points, and I omit filling up the outline of the 
argument. I have said what I supposed was 
most essential. And now, in conclusion let me 
say that I appear here to discuss this subject 
before yon for no purpose of idle display or of 
amusement, but with a proper ol^ject; with an 
idea to its examination and discussion by others; 
and what I shall desire, and what will repay 
me a thousandfold for any inconvenience in 
attending here and any effort in speaking, will 
be the support of the press and people of Phila¬ 
delphia to anew, improved, and honorable sys¬ 
tem of electoral action by which our represent¬ 
ative system in this country will be vastly im¬ 
proved, and by which the future of our country 
will receive an additional guarantee and secur¬ 
ity which v/ill not fail it hereafter in peace or 
in war. [Great applause.] 


V 











APPENDIX. 

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES IN PARLIAMENT UPON LIMITED VOTING 

IN TRIANGULAR DISTRICTS. 


In the House of Lords, Jidy 30, 1867, 

The reform bill being under consideration— 

Lord Cairns moved an amendment, to come 
in after clause 8 of the bill, as follows: 

"At any contested election for any county or bor¬ 
ough represented by three members no person shall 
vote for more than two candidates." 

In supporting this amendment he explained 
that there would be at least eleven constitu¬ 
encies to which the plan proposed by it would 
be at once applicable, and he foresaw that if 
there should be a further alteration in the dis¬ 
tribution of electoral power the great proba¬ 
bility was that such alteration would go in the 
direction of increasing those three-cornered 
constituencies. This consideration made him 
more anxious that some proposition of this 
kind should be adopted. He then proceeded 
at length to present the reasons which had 
occurred to him in favor of his amendment, 
and to answer and repel certain objections 
which might be urged against it. 

A debate followed, in which the amendment 
was supported by Earl Russell, Earl Spencer, 
Earl Stanhope, Earl Cowper, the Earl of Car¬ 
narvon, Lord Houghton, the Earl of Shrews¬ 
bury, and Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe ; and 
was opposed on behalf of the administration 
by the Earl of Malmesbury and the Duke of 
Marlborough. Lord Denman suggested that 
the proposition should be made the subject of 
a separate bill. 

Upon a division the vote stood: 


For the amendment.142 

Against it. 51 

Majority. 91 


Lord Cairns then proposed the following 
additional clause: 

"At a contested election for the city of London no 
person shall vote for more than three candidates." 

The clause was agreed to. 

The London Times the day following con¬ 
tained an eli^orate and powerful editorial in 
support of the proposition and in commenda¬ 
tion of the action taken by the House of Lords. 

It declared that that House had “by a single 
vote covered many errors and justified the 
opinions of its warmest admirers. Such a 
triumph of reason and trutli,” it continued, 
“may well startle us, accustomed as we have 
been during this session to the rapid growth 
of convictions.” “ The idea of modifying our 
electoral machinery so as to secure in three- 
membered constituencies the proportionate 
representation of both the great divisions of i 


party has made its way by its inherent jus¬ 
tice. The verdict of the lords has been de¬ 
cisive, but we do not believe that it in any 
degree outstrips the independent opinion of 
the House of Commons, still less that it is at 
variance with the deliberate judgment of the 
country. It has been everywhere confessed 
that the adoption in one form or another of 
the principle of cumulative voting was essen¬ 
tial to maintain the character of our institu¬ 
tions, and that through it, and through it alone, 
could the redistribution of electoral power 
(which all prescient statesmen regard as in¬ 
evitable) be reconciled with the preservation 
of our representative government.” 

“The arguments on behalf of the proposal 
advanced by Lord Cairns were overwhelming. 
He himself treated the question in the suc¬ 
cinct dialectic style, of which he is a master, 
and the chain of his reasoning was perfect. 
But he did not stand alone. In fact every one 
who took part in the discussion, with the ex¬ 
ception of the ministers Avho represented the 
Government, was on his side. It mattered not 
whether, like Lord Russell, they spoke from 
the front bench of the Opposition, or like Lord 
Stanhope and Lord Shrewsbury, they avowed' 
themselves faithful supporters of the admin¬ 
istration and resolute to do nothing which 
should interfere, with the success of the bill 5 
whether, like Lord Spencer and Lord Cowper, 
they expressed the views of independent Lib¬ 
erals; like Lord Carnarvon, they argued from 
the position of a thoughtful Conservative; 
like Lord Stratford, they uttered the senti¬ 
ments of a man above party, or like Lord 
Houghton, confessed their sympathy with pure 
democracy, the result was the same. One and 
all saw in the proposed representation of mi¬ 
norities a suggestion consonant with the strict¬ 
est principles of justice and equity, and there¬ 
fore to be depended upon as stable when arti¬ 
ficial securities must prove worthless.” 

“ It is only necessary to remember that the 
House of Commons consults and deliberates 
as well as votes to see how necessary it is to 
the due performance of its functions that it 
should contain members representing all sec¬ 
tions of the community. The power of decis¬ 
ion can never be endangered by the propor¬ 
tionate representation of minorities, but the 
deliberate formation of opinion is exposed to 
great hazard il the moderating influences of 
dissenting minorities be excluded. Ikirliament 
itself must be im])roved by the addition of 
such men as will be chosen by the wealthy and 












11 


% 


intelligent merchants and manufacturers who 
are now unrepresented in the largest towns, 
and of the members who will be returned by 
the Liberal minorities of counties. The effect 
of Lord Cairns’s amendment on the mem- 
j bers for three-membered constituencies must 
be equally beneficial, and its consequences on* 
the constituencies themselves will prove of 
transcendant importance. The voters who 
are now hopelessly outvoted and whose polit¬ 
ical energies become feeble by disuse will 
start into fresh vitality. Enfranchised in deed, 
and not merely in name, they will be animated 
by the consciousness of power. They will be 
brought into direct relation with the Legisla¬ 
ture.” “The lords have shown’their inde¬ 
pendence and their foresight. At a point of 
the highest importance in the history of the 
representative institutions of the country they 
have been faithful to themselves and to their 
duties. On minor questions they have shown 
themselves too ready to defer to the decision 
of the ministers of the Crown, but when the 
character of the future government of the 
nation was at stake they asserted their own 
judgment against all attempts to betray them 
to a false position.” 


In the House of Commons^ August 8, 18G7. 

On the order of the day for the consideration 
of the amendments made by the House of 
Lords to the reform bill, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Mr. Disraeli, said that the Cairns 
amendment “had been opposed on the part 
of her Majesty’s Government in the House of 
Lords v/ith all the authority that a Government 
can fairly exercise over a deliberative assembly; 
but he was bound to say that it was carried by 
an overwhelming majority; indeed, he must con¬ 
fess that it was almost unanimously carried by 
the House of Lords, because, when the minority 
was told, he observed that it consisted almost 
entirely of the members of the administration.” 
He therefore, in deference to this strong expres¬ 
sion of opinion by the House of Lords, advised 
a concurrence in the amendment. 

Subsequently, the same evening, when the 
amendment came up for distinct consideration, 
Mr. Bright moved to disagree with the amend¬ 
ment of the Lords. He expressed surprise at 
the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
in view of his former speech when the same 
matter had been previously before the House. 
He wished he could find a suitable word to ex¬ 
press his contempt for the proposition without 
expressing in the slightest degree anything that 
might be offensive to honorable members on 
his side of the House. But the member from 
Westminster (Mr. Mill) and his friends thought 
that the plan was in some degree an approach 
to the principle of the plan under which every¬ 
body should be represented and under which 
such things as majorities and minorities in 
election contests should hereafter be unknown. 
[Hear, hear, from Mr. Mill.] 

Nov,', he thought those gentlemen who were 
in favor of Mr. Hare’s plan were not in the 
slightest degree bound to support this plan. 


There was no intention in the country at pres¬ 
ent to establish Mr. Hare’s plan, and the car- 
lying of this proposition would be an unmixed 
injustice to ihe boroughs affected by it. The 
proposition was not likely to lead to the plan 
of Mr. Hare, but probably to have a contrary 
effect by reason of the ill will it would create 
in these large boroughs and in the country. 
The change proposed to be made was a funda¬ 
mental change. There was no precedent for 
it in parliamentary history. It affected funda¬ 
mentally the power of not only the constitu¬ 
ency but of every individual in it. The altera¬ 
tion proposed had not been asked for. During 
six hundred years the principle of election by 
the majority had prevailed in the selection of 
members of the House. He suggested that 
the House at least suspend its decision in favor 
of the proposition until it had been a lo'nger 
time before the country and a fuller opportu¬ 
nity afforded the constituencies of making up 
their minds upon it. He cited the cases of 
Liverpool, Manchester, Birmingham, and 
Leeds. They had been entitled to two mem¬ 
bers each, making eight altogether. By the 
bill they Avere each to have one additional 
member, and under the plan proposed there 
would be eight on one side and four on the 
other upon important public "questions, and of 
course the four on one side would neutralize 
four of those on the other. Assuming that 
party ties were adhered to these four' great 
constituencies Avould be so emasculated and 
crippled that they would have but four votes 
to bestow which would affect any of those 
great questions to which he had referred. The 
assigning of additional members to those bor¬ 
oughs upon this plan would not increase but 
would actually diminish their power in the 
House. He could speak, he was sure, for 
Manchester and for Birmingham, that the great 
majority of the constituency and population of 
those towns Avould be opposed to the proposi¬ 
tion that additional members should be given 
them, if given under this crippling and inju¬ 
rious clause. 

Mr. Beresford Hope declared himself un¬ 
able to rise to the heights of democratic Tory¬ 
ism which had characterized the speech of the 
honorable member for Birmingham [Mr. 
Bright.] Was the case of Birmingham mis¬ 
erable above that of all other boroughs ? Bir¬ 
mingham was the seat of one of our great 
staples ; Stoke Aras another. He himself Avas 
the majority member for Stoke and his honor¬ 
able colleague Avas the minority member for 
that borough. The Conseiwatives Avere entitled 
to one member, but he Avas of opinion that 
from their wealth, position, intellect, and num¬ 
bers the Liberals of Stoke were likewise 
entitled to send a member to Parliament. 
Well, one Conservative and one Liberal Avere 
returned by the borough. Would the honor¬ 
able member from Birmingham say it Avas hum¬ 
bled in consequence of that circumstance? So 
far was he from taking such a vicAv that he 
had refused to bb concerned in bringing doAvn 
a second ConserA'ative member because he 
believed it would be tyranny to do so. There 




















12 


were, say fifty-five thousand Conservatives and 
forty-five thousand Liberals in Stoke. 

Now, would it be lair that either of those 
parties should be unrepresented? By the 
existing arrangement the whole population of 
Stoke was better served in that House. So 
much for the case of the two-handed boroughs ; 
and if they took the case of the three-handed 
boroughs it was a juggling with v/ords and a 
misrepresentation of fact to say that a repre¬ 
sentation of minorities would deprive the ma¬ 
jorities in those boroughs, of a fair share of 
representation in that House. If the minority 
in Birmingham should secure a member who 
could equal the honorable member (Mr. Bright) 
in eloquence it would give them a very great 
advantage indeed ; but he denied that giving 
the third member for that borough to the minor¬ 
ity would be apolitical injustice to the borough. 
If honorable members came to the House of 
Commons merely to count noses at the table 
there Avould be • something in the honorable 
member’s argument; but in no other sense 
would the influence of the two Liberal ra«n- 
bers for Birmingham be counterbalanced. The 
honorable member, whom he Avas happy to see 
on the front Opposition bench—(Mr. Bright 
was in conversation with Mr. Gladstone)—for 
no man had abetter right to that position, and 
he would be there hereafter, [a laugh,] had 
drawn a touching picture of four towns who 
had at present eight members and would have 
twelve, but who, if this amendment of the 
lords were adopted, would only have four; but 
if he might ask the honorable gentleman to 
descend from the regions of eloquence to those 
of plain fact, he would invite him to examine 
how matters really stood on these four boroughs. 
Llanchester had two Liberal members; Liver¬ 
pool liad two Conservative members; so that 
these two boroughs wrote each other off. Leeds 
had one Liberal member and one Conserva¬ 
tive; thus its two members wrote each other 
oft’. Birmingham, however, had the good for¬ 
tune to be represented by two Liberals; so 
that according to the doctrine of the honor¬ 
able member the Avhole four boroughs were 
represented by his colleague and himself. [A 
laugh, and “hear, hear.”] 

Sir J. Jervoise advocated the proposition 
for giving representation to the minority. He 
observed that if any argument were needed in 
support of such a proposal it would be found 
in the fact that the Government, though in the 
minority, had brought in this reform bill. [A 
laugh, and “hear, hear.”] 

Mr. ScouRFiEiJ) had voted for the j^roposal 
before and would support it again. He cor¬ 
dially agreed Avith what had been said by the 
honorable member for Westminster a feAv even¬ 
ings since—that he Avould not desire to see 
oppression practiced, even by the side to Avhich 
he Avas most attached. When the honorable 
member for Birmingham said that the liberties 
of England would suffer detriment if there were 
no election contests he could not help think¬ 
ing that the honorable member spoke as if the 
life-blood of all the election agents and laAvyers 
in the kingdom were floAving in his veins. 


[Laughter.] The fact Avas, that election con¬ 
tests Avere frequently unmitigated curses, and 
many places had been seriously injured by 
their means. [“Hear, hear.”] He Avas not 
aAvare, for instance, that Lancaster, Totness, 
lieigate, and Great Yarmouth were any better 
'off because they had been the scenes of con¬ 
tested Elections. [ ‘ ‘ Hear, hear. ” ] , 

Mr. Buxton Avished to touch upon a single 
argument Avhich had not, he thought, receiv^ed 
the attention it deserved. It seemed to him 
that valuable as the other results would be of 
the adoption of the proposed arrangement, no 
one of them Avould be of greater importance 
than this: that it Avould call forth so much 
political vigor and life in the constituencies to 
which it Avas applied. It Avas curious that those 
who had not given this subject much consider¬ 
ation often objected to this proposal, because 
they said that by extinguishing contests this 
arrangement would destroy political \dtality. 
He Avas confident that its effect would be ex¬ 
actly the reverse ; that it Avould be of singular 
use in preventing political stagnation.^ Ihat 
Avould be clear if, instead of dealing Avith the 
question in the abstract, they took a concrete 
example. Take, for example, the town of 
Birmingham, in Avhich it Avas proposed to adopt 
this plan. Could there be a doubt tha:t if no 
such arrangement AA^ere made Birmingham 
Avould henceforth return three gentlemen of 
the same political hue? 

The Liberal committee would select three 
candidates, and the majority of householders 
in the borough would be certain to support 
them. If there ever were a contest it Avould 
be a contest between the Liberals bidding 
against each other; but in all human proba¬ 
bility there Avould be no contest at all; and 
those electors, perhaps a very large and im¬ 
portant body of men, but who might not go so 
far in their political vieAvs as the mass of small 
householders, would be politically extinct. 
They Avould feel it totally hopeless to attempt 
to carry a candidate, and they would resign 
themselves v/itli more or less bitterness to 
political death. They Avould feel that they 
Avere altogether excluded from any influence 
Avhatever over the destinies of their country ; 
not merely that they could not hope to rule, 
but that they could not even be represented in 
the council of the nation. They Avould ac¬ 
cordingly sink into hopeless apathy, Avhile the 
majority ha\dng everything their own way, not 
enjoying the advantage of being opposed and 
forced to struggle and strive, Avould themselves 
also be likely to grow at once apathetic and 
arrogant. He was not devising this state of 
things out of his own imagination ; they knew 
that exactly this had happened in many in¬ 
stances both across the Avater and in certain 
constituencies at home, where one party, be it 
Conservative or be it Liberal, had held irresist¬ 
ible SAvay. It would be invidious to do so; 
otherAvise he could easily remind the House 
of many boroughs and many counties in Avhich 
utter apathy and stagnation had * actually 
resulted from the feeling of the minority that 
any exertion of theirs must be vain. 










13 


Bat now suppose, on the other hand, that 
instead of all the three seats being at the dis 
posal of one committee the arrangement now 
proposed were adopted; immediately every 
elector in the constituenc}'’ would be stirred 
into life. Those who belonged to the minority 
instead of giving up the whole affair as a bad 
' ’job, shrugging their shoulders, and feeling that 
although they were Englishmen they were as 
destitute of political influence as if they were 
so many Indians, would immediately begin to 
organize themselves as a party to form a com¬ 
mittee to look out for a candidate and combine 
to carry him. He admitted that very possibly 
no contest would ensue; but there would be as 
much demand for strenuous exertions and for 
individual self-sacrifice on the part of the 
minority as if a contest were certain. Political 
deadness would be exchanged for political 
animation. But to the majority this change 
would bring no less cause of excitement and 
vigor. Instead of gleefully accepting their three 
candidates and carrying them without an effort 
the party would be driven to keep its machinery 
in high order, to choose the best candidates 
that could be found, and, in short, to strain 
every nerve to hold their own. And yet, though 
eaqji party would thus be compelled to be on 
the alert and to maintain its vigor, actual con¬ 
tests would probably be rare. The beauty of 
this arrangement would be that it would give 
all the political activity that contests are sup¬ 
posed to engender, but without that grievous 
moral injury that contests almost inevitably 
inflict. Now, it has been shown that these 
eleven constituencies affected by this proposi¬ 
tion would contain 2,300,000 persons. If, then, 
the minority should not be able to carry its 
candidate no harm could ensue; but if they 
carried them all they must represent a body of 
some 600,000 or 700,000 persons. It could only 
be for the advantage not only of the minority 
itself but of the majority as well, and of Par¬ 
liament, and of the nation, that such a body of 
men, comprising a large proportion of the wealth 
and intelligence of our largest cities, should 
enjoy some share of influence over the destinies 
of their country. 

Sir C. Russell, as a representative of one of 
the three-cornered constituencies, opposed the 
Lords’ amendment, but his remarks were not 
important nor prolonged. 

Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen, in supporting 
the amendment, differed from many to whose 
judgment he w'as accustomed to defer. But he 
was about to give his vote with the sanction of 
high authority, for the proposition had pre¬ 
viously received the support of a large minority 
of that House taken in about equal proportions 
from both political parties, and had now received 
the support of a large majority of the other 
House, embracing names identified with the 
growth of liberal principles in the country. The 
honorable member from Birmingham [Mr. 
Bright] had said that Birmingham ought to have 
a larger representation than Arundel; but if a 
third member were given to Birmingham on 
the plan proposed he would pair against one 


of the majority members, and the representa¬ 
tion would be reduced virtually to a level with 
that of Arundel, which had one member. The 
fallacy of that argument was this: what the 
honorable gentleman and his colleague repre¬ 
sented was not really the whole community of 
Birmingham, but some 6,000 or 8,000 elect¬ 
ors as opposed to some 4,000 or 6,000 who 
differed from him and were totally unrepre¬ 
sented. But to go one step further. It was 
true that upon questions in which party inter¬ 
ests alone were involved, under the proposed 
system the three members from Birmingham 
would go into the lobby, two on one side and 
one on the other. Yet with regard to all ques¬ 
tions affecting local interests as Avell as those 
great commercial and manufacturing questions 
on which Birmingham was peculiarly entitled 
to be heard, the three members would be found 
voting together and throwing their whole weight 
into the scale in the interest of that great con¬ 
stituency. 

The honorable member said Birmingham 
would not have its full weight in the repre¬ 
sentative body. Did he mean to say that the 
wealth, the importance of a constituency was 
derived only from the majority? Had the con¬ 
servative minority in London nothing to do with 
the weight and importance of the constituency? 
It was plain that they ought to give representa¬ 
tion to all the elements that constituted the 
importance of a constituency. 

He insisted that two great advantages would 
be secured by adopting the proposed system of 
representation. In the first place, in times of 
popular excitement it would insure the return 
to Parliament of eminent men who would other¬ 
wise be excluded. Did the honorable member' 
from Birmingham recollect the result of the 
China vote and his exclusion from Parliament? 
[Hear.] Similar cases might occur in time 
to come, and honest and able men might be 
excluded from Parliament when their services 
would be most necessary for the welfare of the 
country, and when thousands of their fellow- 
countrymen would be willing to combine to 
secure their return. 

The second great advantage from the adop¬ 
tion of this system was the inducement it 
would offer to large numbers of persons to 
take part in the political affairs of the country, 
who might otherwise be indisposed to give 
their votes. This was neither a party nor a 
class question, because there were large Liberal 
minorities in counties, as there were large 
Conservative minorities in towns, which were 
now unrepresented, and had no inducement 
to vote. -He desired to see the greatest amount 
of intelligence and the largest number of 
persons possible engaged in taking part in 
our political affairs. Such participation was 
one of the most essential elements of democ¬ 
racy— that every man in the community should 
feel himself to be a component part of the 
State—should assist in framing the laws which 
he had to obey, and should throw his whole 
individual strength and vigor into the consti¬ 
tution. Now, if this principle of representa- 


















14 


tion was a right one, why should they shrinlc 
from adopting it because it was said that, for 
the last six hundred years, the precedents had 
been the other way ? [Hear, hea-i’.] England 
was the foremost in the van of civilization, and 
why should she not, in reforming her whole 
representative institutions, inti’oduce a plan of 
this sort, if it were shown to be a good one, 
and thus render her constitution a model for 
the world? [Hear.] But the honorable 
member from Birmingham had asked why the 
proposal, if adopted, was to be limited to a 
few large boroughs, and not be applied to 
every constituency throughout the country ? 
He would reply, that if it were shown to be 
good, why should they reject it because its 
application was limited? If it turned out that 
it worked well, nothing could be easier than 
to extend its operation hereafter. The vote 
which he was about to give he believed to be 
a wise and patriotic one, and he knew it to be 
an honest one, as it was founded upon sincere 
convictions. 

Mr. Newdegate supported the amendment. 
He believed that if it were adopted it would 
be possible hereafter further to redistribute 
the represenfation of the country so as to 
secure justice, both in boroughs and counties. 
He should vote for it because he hoped the 
result of it would be to give the people, as 
they advanced in intelligence, fuller opportu¬ 
nities than had been hitherto accorded them 
of making their opinions known in that House. 

Mr. Goscuex spoke against the amendment, 
insisting that it had not been duly considered ; 
that it was an innovation and not conservative 
in character. The remainder of his remarks 
were composed principally of criticisms upon 
the various positions occupied by members 
who supported the proposition. 

Mr. Hubbard said the bill was full of inno¬ 
vations, that the objection that this proposi¬ 
tion was an innovation applied to the whole 
bill. Was not household suffrage itself an 
innovation? 

Mr. Gladstone spoke at length and against 
the amendment. A prominent point in his 
speech was that if the proposition were agreed 
to it would have to be extended hereafter to 
the constituencies generally ; and he distinctly 
indicated that such extension would be made. 
He insisted upon further time for considering 
so important a proposition, and repeated the 
argument that the addition of one member to 
Birmingham and each of the other boroughs 
mentioned in the bill would not be advan¬ 
tageous to them upon the new plan of voting; 
for the power of majorities therein, instead of 
being in point of fact increased, would be 
diminished. His most important observation, 
however, should be given in his exact lan¬ 
guage. It was as follows: 

“If adopted at all, this proposition must be adopted 
with perhaps the knowledge, and at least with the 
certainty, that whether we admit it ourselves or not 
it must unfold and expand itself over the whole 
C 9 untry and completely reconstruct the system of 
distribution of seats.” [Bear, hear.] 

Mr. Lowe concluded the debate Avith an 


animated and able speech in favor of the 
amendment. He remarked that his right hon¬ 
orable friend [Mr. Gladstone] had said that 
he considered the constituency and the ma¬ 
jority of the constituency the same thing; in 
those few words summing up the whole fallacy 
wliich had pervaded the debate. Tlie honor¬ 
able member from Birmingham’s speech rested 
on the grouudle.ss assumption that when any¬ 
thing was true of the majority of Birmingham 
it was true of the whole of Birmingham. 
Taking their own arguments, he wondered that 
gentlemen who refused to give representation 
to minorities were Avilling to even admit their 
existence. He should like to knov/ on what 
principle they acted in forcing on the Gov¬ 
ernment a third member in the boroughs ex¬ 
cept as an homage to numbers. [Cheers.] It 
was said that in introducing personal repre¬ 
sentation you were doing aAvay with local rep¬ 
resentation. This is again the same fallacy. 
Gentlemen have accustomed themselves so 
much to overlook the existence of minorities 
that they will not allow them to live even in the 
places where they actually reside. [Laughter.] 
He could notin the least understand what there 
was in a minority that should make it less local 
because it was less numerous. 

Mr. Lowe concluded as follows: There is a 
sort of worship of the majority which, after all, 
is a mere political superstition. True repre¬ 
sentation, the idea of true representation, is to 
leave no portion of the constituencies iinrep^!' 
resented. [Hear.] We have a specimen of 
the old and rugged way of doing things in the 
case of juries. We require them to be unani¬ 
mous, and as that is not in the nature of hu¬ 
man things, we shut them up in ‘‘durance vile” 
until they come to an agreement. That system 
not having been found practicable under all 
circumstances, mankind hit upon the plan of 
representation by majorities as a better mode 
of settling their differences. Well, there is no 
absolute reason for stopping there. The art 
of representation, like other arts, is progres¬ 
sive ; and if means can be found for increas¬ 
ing the number of members, and then adopting 
your system to that increase by the cumula¬ 
tive vote, so as not to disfranchise minorities 
and to give some representation to the whole 
of the constituency, so far from regarding that 
as an innovation upon the constitution I think 
we ought to hail it as an advance in the science 
of government. [Cheers.] 

The great difference between ancient and 
modern societies lies in the invention of the 
principle of representation. It was from the 
want of that power of representation that the 
Homan empire was reduced to place itself 
under the tyranny of a Caesar. It is only by 
the existence of that power that*large free 
governments have become possible. This is 
just an instance of the changes which may be 
produced by the use of the most simple expe¬ 
dients. Instead of regarding this principle Avith 
hatred and jealousy, I think Ave shall act more 
Avisely if Ave investigate and accept it as a just 
and necessary improvement of that system of 









representative government which has obtained 
among us, upon which, in a great measure, the 
perpetuity and glory of our country depend. 
The House then divided, when there ap¬ 


peared : 

Ayes.204 

Noes.253 

I Majority. 49 


So the motion to disagree to the Lords’ 
amendment was lost, and the clause stood a 
part of the bill. The announcement of the 
numbers was received with cheers. 

The next amendment, that at a contested 
election for the city of London no person 
should vote for more than three candidates, 
was then, after a brief debate, agreed to by 
a majority of sixty-four. 


When the reform bill was first considered by 
the House of Commons the cumulative vote 
was proposed by way of amendment but re¬ 
jected. The motion for it was made by Mr. 
Lowe on the 4th of July, in the following 
words ^ 

“That at any contested election for a county or 
borough represented by more than two members, and 
having more than one seat vacant, every voter shall 
be entitled to a number of voles equal to the num¬ 
ber of vacant seats, and may give all such votes to 
one candidate or may distribute them among the 
candidates as he thinks fit.” 

This amendment was debated on the day of 
its introduction and again on the next day, and 
received the support of the mover and of Mr. 
Liddell, Mr. Thomas Hughes,, Mr. Gorst, Mr. 
Morrison, Mr. Beach, Mr. Fawcett, Mr. Newde- 
gate. Viscount Cranborne, Mr. J. Stuart Mill, 
and Mr. Buxton, while it was opposed by Mr. 
Shaw Lefevre, Sir Robert Collier, Mr. Adder- 
ley, Mr. Bright, Mr. Henley, and the Chan¬ 
cellor of the Exchequer. 

It was lost by a vote of, yeas 173, nays 314. 
The large number of votes it received upon its 
first consideration was evidence of its strength 
whenever it should be subjected to examin¬ 


ation and debate, and inspirited its friends to 
further exertion. In fact, it appeared evident 
that the opposition of the administration, 
through the Chancellor of the Exchequer, alone 
prevented its adoption at that time, and such 
explanation of the result was distinctly stated 
by the Times of August 9 in editorial com¬ 
ments upon the adoption of the Cairns’ amend¬ 
ment. It is to be remembered constantly in 
following the debates in the House of Com¬ 
mons that the prominent men who spoke against 
the cumulative vote and the Cairns’ amend¬ 
ment represented districts which were to elect 
three members under the provisions of the 
bill. Consequently they were deeply inter¬ 
ested as political men in securing in their home 
districts the election of the third member by 
the majority. Buckinghamshire, represented 
by Mr. Disraeli, Birmingham, rej^resented by 
Mr. Bright, and other districts that contributed 
speakers to the debate in opposition to the pro¬ 
posed reform, are all three-member districts, 
in which the local political majority could not, 
under the new plan, elect the third member. 

It remains to be observed in this review of • 
the proceedings in Parliament that the Cairns’ 
amendment secures substantially the same re¬ 
sult as the cumulative vote would in the dis¬ 
tricts, the counties, and boroughs, to which it is 
applied. In the triangular districts it will 
ordinarily, secure the third member to the 
minority, and in London (which elects four 
members) the fourth member. But it is very 
evident that it is a proposition which is inca¬ 
pable of extended application, and therefore 
inferior to the plan of the cumulative vote. 
The latter will adapt itself conveniently and 
effectually to all districts electing more than 
one member, while the Cairns’ amendment can 
hardly be extended beyond the triangular dis¬ 
tricts to which it has a convenient application. 


Note. —The Philadelphia speech given in 
the present publication may be considered a 
continuation of Mr. Buckalew’s speech deliv¬ 
ered i|jj the Senate July 11, 1867.— [Congres¬ 
sional Globe, 1st Session, 4.0th Congress,p. 575.) 


Printed at the Congressional Globe Office. 






















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